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CryptoVerif: a Computationally-Sound Security Protocol Verifier

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This document presents the security protocol verifier CryptoVerif. CryptoVerif does not rely on the symbolic, Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It can verify secrecy, correspondence (which include authentication), and indistinguishability properties. It produces proofs presented as sequences of games, like those manually written by cryptographers; these games are formalized in a probabilistic process calculus. CryptoVerif provides a generic method for specifying security properties of the cryptographic primitives. It produces proofs valid for any number of sessions of the protocol, and provides an upper bound on the probability of success of an attack against the protocol as a function of the probability of breaking each primitive and of the number of sessions. CryptoVerif is post-quantum sound: when the used cryptographic assumptions are valid for quantum adversaries, the proofs hold for quantum adversaries. It can work automatically, or the user can guide it with manual proof indications.

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